Beginning of Stabilization in Ukraine?

There are a number of very positive developments in Ukraine. First, Ukraine has a new president — Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko. He garnered over 50% of the vote in the first round, meaning that a second round was not necessary. He is noticeably more modern, educated, and progressive than previous presidents. He enjoys wide support, putting to rest claims that the temporary government in Kiev following Yanukovych's disappearance was "illegitimate."

Putin chose not to interfere before the election and appears to be slowly withdrawing troops from the Ukrainian border. He now has fewer cards to play, but surprise moves can hardly be ruled out. Sanctions from the West appear to be making an impact of some kind.

A small delegation of Ukrainians visited Tbilisi last week. Evgeniya Belorusets — a friend of mine — has a photo exhibit here with photos and texts about Maidan and the events in Eastern Ukraine. There was an interesting discussion at the exhibit with a well-known Ukrainian political analyst, Vladimir Fesenko, present.

Some interesting points from the discussion:

• No one expected special forces to begin shooting at and killing protesters. No one expected that Yanukovych would to actually leave office. No one expected Crimea to actually be annexed, although analysts had speculated on the subject a number of times over the years. No one expected the events in eastern and southern Ukraine. Everyone was caught by surprise — many times. 
• Ukrainian press is operating in conditions of "counter-propaganda" against ridiculous and shameful propaganda in the Russian press, which has more influence abroad and even within Ukraine.
• There is a confluence of crises in Ukraine: political, geopolitical, military, financial, economic, and social. If the government and people fail to handle the crisis, the country will not survive. 

I took away from the discussion a renewed optimism that things in Ukraine would work out. Furthermore, I feel the time is ripe for serious structural changes in government and relations between citizens and government. As soon as things settle down a bit more and I am able to settle my affairs, I would like to return and spend a few months in Ukraine. I don't want to miss the historical moment when new systems are being built and long-term stability returns to the country.

At the same time, the government is conducting a serious anti-terrorist operation in Eastern Ukraine. People are dying nearly every day on both sides. As time passes and the Russians lay low, the Ukrainian army is getting better at its job. Without external support the separatists do not have a chance. Russia is feeling the pressure and seems to be withholding more direct active support of separatists. 

A Moderate View on the Situation in Kiev and Southeast Ukraine from a Russian Politician

While the Ukrainian news site that I follow, Pravda.com.ua, seems to be pretty good at covering news and providing some interesting analysis, it has a few sources of bias that are typical of many news sources:

• Articles sometimes have titles that are misleading or make fun of certain politicians
• The use of loaded terms instead of more neutral descriptors
• More intense coverage of certain issues — what certain politicians/groups/countries are doing wrong — and less coverage of other issues, like mistakes made by the new government. 
• Comments are... often filled with hate in both directions

As a class, journalists tend to be idealistic and naive about some aspects of power politics. But where can you get the other side of the story? I often enjoy analytical articles by political scientists, political advisors, etc. who understand the logic of things better than most journalists. 

There was just one politician in the Russian Duma who voted against the accession of Crimea to Russia on March 20: Ilya Ponomarev. He recently made a trip to Ukraine and reports on the situation there after meeting with politicians and political groups and traveling around the country. I found his report very balanced and indicative of real issues in Ukraine that are poorly covered by Ukrainian Pravda and similar news outlets. 

Here's the original in Russian and a Google Translate version in English. 

Some interesting points from the article that help balance the perspective:

• The new government in Kiev also represents a group of oligarchs and representatives of big business. There has been a redivision of power and property.
• The Euromaidan was a genuine popular protest (who could think otherwise?!), but all it has achieved so far politically is the redistribution of power at the top echelons. A choice between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko as president is not what people went to the streets to achieve. 
• The much talked about lustration process (governments' policies of mass disqualification of those associated with the abuses under the prior regime) is basically stuck because the Maidan demanded it but lustration would threaten the positions of many who have benefited from Euromaidan. So they're trying to do a kind of "selective lustration" that they hope will satisfy Maidan supporters. 
• Pravyy Sektor ("Right Sector") activists are basically just like skinheads in Russia — grown and fed by political powers. But their role in Ukraine is vastly overstated by Russian media. Also, the author reports not encountering any "Banderovtsy" — a vague term thrown around by Russian media to refer to Ukrainian nationalists intent on persecuting Russians and Russian speakers. 
• The Kremlin's actions surrounding Ukraine have severely damaged Russia's reputation in the eyes of Ukrainians. Most of their angst is directed personally at Vladimir Putin, but some of it carries over onto feelings towards Russia and Russians in general, particularly because so many Ukrainians are aware of what Russians think about the issues and the propaganda they are fed through the news. 
• "Russians are the victims of government propaganda and sincerely believe they are saving a brother nation from fascists who have seized power in Kiev thanks to money from the CIA and the European Union."
• Youth in Kiev are enlisting in militias and the army in large numbers. Ponomarev has never seen so many Ukrainian flags and so much patriotism and sees it as a national rebirth. 
• Most Ukrainian citizens viewed Crimea as "not completely Ukrainian" and recognize that the dominant Russian speaking populace always looked towards Russia. That doesn't negate the amoral nature of the takeover.
• People don't just blame Russia for the takeover of Crimea, but also the previous leadership of Ukraine that failed to provide a better life for people there, and the current leadership that failed to defend the peninsula. 
• Kiev is full of alarm and heated political discussions but is still calm. Donetsk Region is currently under battle, and firearms are being used (but no artillery or fighter planes).
• Only 20% of Ukrainian army and police forces joined the Russian side in Crimea. The rest left when given the chance. 
• In the three problem regions of Kharkov, Donetsk, and Lugansk, there are roughly four equal groups: those who want to become part of Russia, those who want to stay in Ukraine but conduct federalization, those who want to preserve a unitary Ukrainian state, and those who are unsure. It's a different situation than Crimea and portends civil war if events continue as they are going.
• "There is no massive Russian intervention, but there are special forces there (GRU? [Main Intelligence Directorate forces — translator]) and subversive groups who perform a directing and organizing role for so-called self-defense forces."
• The main reason for protests in the southeast is not the desire to join Russia, but fear of a new wave of property redistribution and discontent with authorities in Kiev. Russia is but a protector and a provider of stability to these people. 
• 60% of the population in these regions are afraid of "Banderovtsy," 48% of poverty, and 38% — of Russian soldiers. 
• Donbass mine workers look at the situation in Russia's Rostov Oblast, where almost all the coal mines were shut down. They don't want to enter Russia. 
• People in the east are displeased that Kiev government leaders don't come and talk to them or make visits only to their local protégés, and that the national agenda is being set by representatives of western and central regions.
• People in the southeast did not understand why oligarchs were appointed governers of their oblasts and don't believe in the good intentions and ideals of pro-Maidan politicians. 
• The government in Kiev needs to become closer to people in the east if it wants to keep them in the country. They need to go out onto the squares and engage with people and not be afraid of being pelted with eggs. 
• Quite a few high officials actually don't want to keep eastern Ukraine because it is subsidized from the budget and they don't want to revive industry. 
• A referendum on federalization should be held. Only 20-25% of people around the country support federalization, and it would help calm tensions. Without such a referendum the presidential election might be disrupted in the east, with dire consequences. Some politicians in Kiev are coming around to this idea. 

Russia on the Retreat

The tide has turned rather noticeably, and it now seems almost certain that Ukraine will preserve its independence without experiencing military intervention from Russia.

This article in Russian from a Moscow analyst explains the current situation (English translation).

The analyst confirms much of the geopolitical analysis presented in the previous article I mentioned. In particular, the military, economic, and geostrategic logic of the situation demanded that Russia take over eastern and southern Ukraine and establish a territorial link between Transdnistria and Russia proper. This was the Plan B if Plan A didn't work — returning the entire country of Ukraine to Russia (according to author Dmitriy Oleshnik and other sources).

But neither plan is being undertaken for now, and the Kremlin is left with the symbolic acquisition of Crimea, which affords fairly minimal advantages (a big temporary boost in popularity for Putin) and quite substantial financial and political costs. Even Moscow's insistence on "federalizing" Ukraine — which would allow for the eventual absorption of Russia-leaning territories — is largely being ignored by the West, which is now in a position of greater negotiating power.

Oleshnik states that the Kremlin's strategists miscalculated: 1) the degree of unity the West would reach with regards to Ukraine, and 2) the level of social support for Russian interference (lower than expected).

Now Russia is drawing troops back from Ukraine's borders and signaling that it has no intention to intervene militarily in Ukraine. It may still be involved in attempts to sabotage the upcoming May 25 presidential election, but that is starting to look like a more and more difficult task as the new Ukrainian political environment solidifies and the Ukrainian military machine becomes more effective at countering external attempts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine.

What would it take to keep the election from happening? Officially — war or a state of emergency. A plausible way to get Kiev to announce a state of emergency is to create large disruptions through active separatist groups, violence, etc. around Ukraine. An explanation of how Russia might still attempt to make the most out of the current situation is given here by Illarionov (English translation). For some reason I find this increasingly unlikely, but it must be considered a very real possibility.

Ironically, by drawing Crimea's 1.5 million pro-Russia voters out of electorate, the Kremlin has substantially decreased the likelihood that the next president will come from the eastern industrial regions, where Russia has more leverage.

More Geopolitical Explanations of Russia's Interest in Ukraine

I was recently referred to this article (English translation), which put Russia's actions in Ukraine in the broader context of global geopolitical maneuvering. This type of big-picture realpolitik analysis almost never makes the news, so I think many readers will find it very instructional, as have I.

For instance, the author makes that point that Russia is very concerned about the U.S.'s ability to disable most of its nuclear weapons through long-range missiles and deployment of PRO anti-missile systems near Russia. Taking over part of Ukraine's territory would give Russia much better striking capabilities against U.S. allies in Europe, decreasing the likelihood that the U.S. would engage in a unilateral punitive strike against Russia.

The idea that Russia might be working towards an eventual continental alliance with Germany was also news to me.

Basically, I highly recommend this article.

Will Ukraine Continue to Exist as a Sovereign State?

For many years I've said a terrible thing to my Ukrainian friends in private conversations:

"I don't even know if Ukraine will exist in twenty years." 

The country has only been independent for a little over two decades and suffers from deep — though hardly insurmountable — political, cultural, and linguistic divisions. It has historically not remained independent for lengthy periods of time, and regional wars tend to rewrite its boundaries. Even though a whole generation has grown up accustomed to the idea of an independent Ukraine, a sense of fragility has always lingered in the air.

It appears that Ukraine's moment of truth has arrived. The country currently known as Ukraine is now at a historical crossroads. The range of possible near-term scenarios is more or less clear, but there is absolutely no certainty as to which path the country will take.

The same could have been said about Maidan a month or two ago. Nobody was sure which side would win, and there were many moments of near-despair among Maidan supporters. The failure of Berkut riot police to clear Maidan by brute force and Yanukovich's sudden flight to Russia caught most people by surprise — apparently even Putin.

Back then most people outside of politics (me included) thought that the struggle was about standing up for basic human rights and freedoms and getting rid of a regime that systematically trampled those rights and busied itself with self-enrichment. Since then a major paradigm shift has taken place among large numbers of Ukrainians as it has become plainly evident that the real game is not an internal, domestic struggle against the oligarchic regime of Yanukovich and his family, but a much shrewder long-term geopolitical game planned out some years ago in the Kremlin and well-known to Western diplomats.

The game revolves around the Kremlin's desire to reestablish the former sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, increase its territory where possible by adding areas with large numbers of ethnic Russians, and surround its borders with non-threatening states.

I tried to write that as neutrally as possible. I could restate it in a way that would make most Westerners shudder. But ultimately, is the Kremlin's desire that much different from what any major world power strives to do?

I don't feel I can rightfully condemn Russia's leaders, or tell people whom Crimea should belong to, or what Ukraine's borders should be, or whether it should try to join the E.U. and/or NATO. These are questions that don't have unequivocal right or wrong answers, and it's up to more impassioned people than I to figure that out.

If you take a really long view, such matters are of less importance than preserving and improving soil fertility and biodiversity, the loss of which would throw human civilization back to a much more primitive stage of development and permanently limit humanity's options. Compared to preserving the basic ecology upon which civilization depends, the problem of Ukraine is relatively trivial.

And yet it's one of the most important geopolitical moments of the past decade, and it will affect tens of millions of people and cause long-lasting global repercussions.

I'd like to refer readers to two interviews with political analyst and former Putin aide Andrey Illarionov which provide, arguably, the greatest clarity as to what is going on in Ukraine. The interviews are both in Russian and can be Google translated to a fair level of readability.

1. "Putin Believes that Part of Ukraine Should Belong to Russia" (10.10.2013)

2. "No One Will Help the Victim of Agression If the Victim Himself Does Not Resist" (17.03.2014)

If Illarionov's understanding of the situation is correct (it makes a lot of sense and is gaining traction in Ukraine), then it appears that the new government of Ukraine is currently pursuing a strategy of non-resistance and reliance upon foreign powers that will likely lead to the eventual loss of national sovereignty. Somewhat surprisingly, some western powers, such as the United States, are urging Ukraine to continue showing restraint and not react to provocation. And yet if Maidan protesters had pursued such a risk-averse course of action, Yanukovich would still be in power today.

There is a whole list of practical steps that the new government could have taken in the past 20 days to safeguard Ukraine's borders and critical infrastructure and make it much more difficult for the Kremlin to carry out its plans in Crimea and eastern and southern Ukraine. I remember Illarionov listing these actions about two weeks ago.

It is unclear (to me) whether this failure is due to new leaders simply lacking the courage to take responsibility for decisions that could cost the lives of Ukrainian troops, because of organizational chaos following their sudden rise to power, or because of an actual behind-the-scenes agreement with Moscow, western countries, and/or competing political and business groups who have their own stakes in the situation. In any case, Illarionov describes how such a strategy of appeasement is likely to lead both to a loss of sovereignty and loss of life, mainly among Ukrainian nationalists, Crimean Tatars, and Maidan supporters who risk being targeted as threats to the new status quo.

It is conceivable that there could be more Maidans in the near future if Ukrainians become upset with the new government's lack of decisiveness in defending Ukraine's sovereignty. There seems to be both a growing awareness of these issues (news and viewpoints spread very fast these days) and a growing readiness for war among much of the population of Kiev and likely elsewhere around Ukraine. These Maidans could bring more decisive, hawkish, and nationalistic leaders to power, as often happens durings times of war. That would probably not be good news for the Kremlin; I don't know what their plan is for that scenario, but their risks would grow substantially.

It's possible the new government will become more decisive as time goes on, but it's hard to imagine that happening without sustained popular pressure (i.e. demonstrations). It's probably safe to assume that the Kremlin and western powers have their representatives inside Ukraine who convey certain messages (offers, guarantees, threats, etc.) to national politicians. In the absence of popular pressure at home, Ukrainian leaders often end up serving other masters.

It's pretty clear now what those masters want. The West wants to see Ukraine gradually integrate into Europe, harmonize legislation and political culture, and open up its markets. The Kremlin wants to see Ukraine back in the fold or at least politically benign with minimal risk of popular uprisings.

The only real unknown is the popular self-organizing force that has come to be known as "Maidan." Will Ukrainians come together to force their leaders to protect national interests? Will they decide that it is all the same to them and not resist the scenario that is unfolding? Will only the more politically active western and central parts of Ukraine rise up, and will they fail to gain political influence over the east and south, leading to a possible split of the country? Will popular resistance appear only after Ukraine has effectively been split up and occupied?

Honestly, I have no idea what will happen. But what seems clear now is that Maidan is the unknown variable with the most power to drastically change the outcome for Ukraine.

Developments in Ukraine

Finally some fundamental reforms in Ukraine?
The new government has to cut expenditures by about 17% to avoid default. They are embarking on some serious budget cuts, and the time seems right to make some big reforms in government bureaucracy and management as well. My sense is that the new political environment is very favorable for making systemic changes similar to those undertaken in Georgia by Saakashvili's government in 2004-2005.

Post-Yanukovich discoveries and developments

Journalists and specialists are currently going through masses of documents discovered at Yanukovich's private estate and have created a website in Ukrainian and English called "Yanukovichleaks" to document what they've discovered. I think this process is very important for a society-wide examination of the past to take place.

Dizzying pace of events in Crimea

Crimea is set to hold a referendum on March 16 on whether or not to join the Russian Federation. One can never be sure, but it is almost certain that by the end of March Crimea will be warmly accepted into Russia by the Duma. A description of Russia's tactics in Crimea can be read here. 

A look into the world of Putin and his relations with the West

I found this article very insightful and think it could be spot-on. To understand what is going on in Ukraine, you need to know a bit of the history of Putin's disillusionment with the West. Many articles written in the West have too simplistic a view of the situation in Ukraine/Russia. I've linked to articles here that I believe are closer to the truth.

Ukrainians increasingly coming together 
I can't remember ever seeing so much initiative-taking in Ukraine. All the external pressure and instability, the successful overthrow of a corrupt autocratic government, have really empowered Ukrainians with patriotic feelings and given them a sense of mission. 

Post-Euromaidan Risks

So, in the news lately...

The special forces' assault on Euromaidan was unsuccessful, President Yanukovych has been ousted and is currently nowhere to be found, the death toll is stable at 100+, journalists and economists are studying and publishing sheaths of inside accounting records from the presidential residence, dozens of influential politicians have left the Party of Regions, Tymoshenko has been freed from political imprisonment, those guilty for the military escalation are slowly being searched for and brought to justice. A new government is quickly being formed and gaining back control over the country.

All good news, right? Indeed, but there are very substantial risks ahead.

Domestic political risks

There is substantial risk of disappointment in the new political leaders, similar to what happened following the 2004 Orange Revolution. What will trigger this are things like: an overt focus on dividing portfolios and power amongst themselves without involving new leaders from Euromaidan, an absence of new faces, a focus on secondary issues such as the status of the Russian language versus Ukrainian, a lack of attention to systemic reforms in the judiciary and penitentiary system and in law enforcement, economic decline, etc.

These are very substantial risks, and it would seem that some are playing out right now.

Sovereign debt risks

Ukraine's currency has been rapidly losing value in recent weeks, and the country is close to bankruptcy. Its credit rating was lowered to CCC recently. The country's finances are in sorry shape, and the new government may have to make unpopular decisions in order to keep it afloat. European and Russian creditors are willing to help...

Risk of loss of territory

To try to understand Ukraine's delicate geopolitical situation and the vested interests of Russia and the West, I have found commentary by Polish-American analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Putin aide Andrey Illarionov to be extremely helpful.

Basically, influential policymakers in the Kremlin, with Putin at the center, do not view Ukraine as a full-fledged country and are biding their time to get it — or a large chunk of it — back. Now is a time when Ukraine's strength and prosperity relative to Russia is at a historic low. The country is in the midst of political chaos. Russia's anti-Euromaidan propoganda machine is operating at full throttle and influencing the views of Russians and Ukrainians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine who follow Russian news sources.

Russian news channels have been calling Euromaidan protesters "extremists" and "terrorists" and have been making it seem like they hate Russians and present a physical risk to Russians in Ukraine. It would appear Moscow is preparing to use the pretext of danger to Russian citizens in Ukraine to use various "means" to "offer protection" to their citizens in such a "precarious state of affairs." As noted by former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in recent publications, this tactic was put to use in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

The greatest risk is that Crimea will be destabilized and pressured to secede from Ukraine. There is a somewhat smaller risk that eastern regions such as Donetsk, Lugansk, possibly Kharkiv, and possibly Odessa will follow.

To understand how Ukraine and the West can help avoid this, read Brzezinski's recent article in The Financial Times. I'm no expert on geopolitics, but what he's saying makes more sense than anything I've read from other western analysts.

Cause for optimism

This time around, compared to 2004, Ukrainians seem to be quite a bit wiser and better educated. Social networks (i.e. Facebook, vkontakte, Twitter) have been key in distributing information during and following the Euromaidan demonstrations and confrontation. People are better aware of Russia's motives and the many risks involved. They are more prone to action, petitions, demonstrating, and are more courageous than ever before.

I am very proud of my Ukrainian friends and the Ukrainian people in general and thrilled to see them come to feel more united and empowered. But not everyone is on the bandwagon, though its numbers are growing. Ukraine will need to pursue careful reforms at home without disenchanting large parts of the populace, and wise policies abroad given its position between Europe and Russia.

Tribute to Serhiy Didych, Killed on Maidan February 18th

It's a strange feeling to find out that you know someone who died on Maidan... Serhiy Didych of Horodenko, Ukraine (near Chernivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk) was on the front lines of the barricades on February 18th when he was shot dead by government forces. 

I didn't know Serhiy that well. We only spent 2 days together on a rafting trip down the Dnister River in 2005. But I spent that time talking to him and acting as his interpreter for two tourists from Netherlands. It was nice to get so much Ukrainian practice for once, though I could always switch to Russian when I didn't have all the words I needed. 

Serhiy had a great sense of social responsibility and saw it as his duty to help people organize themselves and live better. I got the sense that everyone in all the villages along the way knew him and respected him. When we had some equipment stolen from the boat during a stop to visit some ruins, he didn't despair because he knew people in all the villages and was confident they would help identify the culprits. 

Serhiy's family treated us to a dinner at his home after the rafting trip. We met his wife and kids. All very nice and friendly. 

Serhiy was a budding community leader interested in politics and improving the lives of people in his region. For some years he ran a tourist guiding business. He loved hiking, and we talked about backpacking together in the Carpathians some time. 

Rest in peace, Serhiy Didych!

Here's a photo collage I put together from our rafting trip, and a picture at bottom of Serhiy's body after he was shot. 

Protests in Kiev Turn Violent

As of January 22nd, 2014, 3 people have now died in increasingly violent clashes between protesters and police in Kiev. Things turned violent after the government passed a set of laws on January 16 that potentially severely limit freedom of speech in Ukraine. The laws were quickly forced through without following proper voting procedures.

Who exactly is behind the violent elements in the standoff with "Berkut" special forces is unclear — provocateurs or genuine protesters. The Ukrainian Internet is filled with inside reports and rumors, and information from government sources paints a very different pictures.

My friends in Kiev are all very concerned. They fear that Ukraine is rapidly being taken down a "Belarussian scenario" towards a Kremlin-controlled dictatorship.

Report from Maidan on the Spirit of Demonstrations in Kiev

This is the translation of something posted by my friend Iryna Lisova on her Facebook page. It conveys the spirit of the Maidan demonstrations in Kiev. 


Today was my first full-time day at the Euromaidan. The Maidan is nearly three weeks old. I am assisting foreign reporters. I've been to both headquarters at Kiev City Hall and the Union Building.

To those who are against the Maidan I wish to say: do you actually like the system that we all live in? I'm one of those who goes to the Maidan not because of the EU issue. I'm simply fed up with bureaucracy, corruption, and the incompetence of government officials high and low, as well as the everyday manifestations of all this.

I am overjoyed to see people finally gathering the courage to speak out. It was always easier for me, too, to say to myself, "I can't do anything about it." I'm happy to say I've begun to believe the opposite.

When I see politicians walking around the halls taking care of business, I can't help thinking: princesses have to poop, too. I can't say I care much for the opposition threesome [I think she means Yatseniuk, Klychko, and Tiagnibok] based on appearance alone; that's just my own issue. Ruslana [famous Ukrainian singer] is magical. She is incredibly tired, but her energy would fill stadiums, I am sure.

At City Hall today journalists were interviewing people from the crowd. A young man of about 20 said more substance per sentence than any politician I heard today.

There's not a single drunk on the street, not a single scuffle. I find myself looking suspiciously at men in striped "Abibas" pants and wondering if they're just petty hooligans or actual provocateurs [people who are paid to break the law or commit violent acts to justify the use of force against demonstrators].

The tea with lemon, ginger, and arrowwood that people are handing out is magnificent.

The weather is something fierce. Tomorrow I'll be wearing all the thermal underwear that I take hiking in the mountains. I just need to get ahold of some thermal skin.

No matter what happens next, things will never be as they were before.

Read about the significance of the Euromaidan at TryUkraine.com

Euromaidan: Where to Follow the News on Demonstrations in Kiev

It is an interesting period for Ukraine right now. On November 21 Ukrainian leaders unexpectedly suspended preparations for signing an Association Agreement with the European Union. Ever since then protests have been taking place in Kiev and other cities around Ukraine. The demonstrations have been called "Euromaidan" and began exactly 9 years to the day after the start of the Orange Revolution.

A substantial majority of Ukrainians support the path of European integration. This is not an issue that splits the country in half like the Orange Revolution. Most politicians consider the country's European course the only possible option. And yet Yanukovich abandoned negotiations.

The latest news can be read at the well-known Pravda.com.ua site in Ukrainian and Russian. Lenta.ru has faster and more news in Russian.

Pravda.com.ua now has a news feed in English.

There is also a TV station broadcasting live in Ukrainian: http://hromadske.tv/

A summary of events can be read on Wikipedia in English.

Read about the significance of the Euromaidan at TryUkraine.com